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COMMENT
Lay Judges in the Polish Criminal
Courts: A Legal and Empirical
Description
INTRODUCTION
T HE PARTICIPATION of laymen in the administration of
justice has long been a subject of controversy, particularly in
those countries where trial by lay judges has become a standard
mode of proceedings. Two basic forms of lay participation in the
administration of justice in
contemporary legal systems
THE AUTHOR: STANISLAW POMORSKI may be distinguished. The
(Master of Law, Doctor of Law, first is the system of mixed
University of Warsaw, Poland) is tribunals composed of pro-
an Associate Professor of Law at the fessional and lay judges sit-
Rutgers University, Camden.
ting together and deciding all
relevant issues of fact and
law. This system, which has been deeply rooted in the German
legal history,' still prevails in several Central, Eastern, and North-
ern European countries. 2  The second is the system of trial by
jury, which even at the height of its acceptance on the European
continent, never attained the position that it occupies in the En-
glish speaking world. Nowadays, on the European continent, as
Professors Casper and Zeisel put it:
. . . the jury is in eclipse. Only Austria, Norway, a few
jurisdictions in Switzerland, and Belgium have retained the
jury.
The jury has thus maintained its position mainly in the or-
bit of the common law. . . . More than ninety percent of the
world's criminal jury trials, and nearly all of its civil jury trials
take place in the United States and it is here that the problem
of lay participation in the judicial process has been posed and
discussed most sharply.3
I J. p. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES, 94-115 (1960).
2 H. KALVEN and H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, 13-14 (1966).
3 G. Casper and H. Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1(1) THE
JOURNAL oF LEGAL STUDIES, 135 (Jan.1972). For a general discussion of the histori-
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The experience of a foreign country concerning lay participa-
tion in the judicial process may thus be of some theoretical and
practical relevance to an American legal audience.
This discussion will start with a general outline of the legal
role of lay judges in Poland, it then reveals certain opinions pre-
vailing within the legal profession concerning their activities, and
finally contrasts the legal model with the real functioning of lay
participation in the administration of criminal justice.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Before World War II Poland had a jury system functioning on
a very limited territorial and jurisdictional basis. It was totally
abolished in 1938 along with the institution of justices of the peace.4
Beginning in 1944 a system of mixed trial courts composed of pro-
fessional and lay judges was gradually introduced. In 1950 the
trial by mixed tribunals became the standard mode of trial in civil
and criminal cases,5 a pattern shared in principle by all socialist
countries. 6
cal development of lay participation in the administration of justice see: J. P.
DAWSON, supra note 1.
For a general historical survey of lay participation in the administration of
justice in the last two centuries, written from the Marxist point of view, compare:
B. Lesnodorski, Czynnik spoleczny w sadach na przcstrzeni dwu stuleci (XVIII-XX)
(Lay Element in Courts During Two Centuries), PANSTWO I PRAWO (No.3 1966).
1 The Law of April 9, 1938; THE JOURNAL OF LAWS OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC
(since 1952, THE JOURNAL OF LAWS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC), No. 24,
Item 213, [hereinafter cited as J.L.]
5 Laws of July 20, 1950, which introduced substantial changes into: 1) The
Law on Court Organization, 2) Code of Criminal Procedure, 3) Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, J.L. No. 38, Items 347, 348, and 349.
6 M. RYBICKI, Lawnicy ludowi w sadach PRL, (People's Lay Judges in The
Courts of the Polish People's Republic) 24,93ff (1968); K. Gurner Sch6ffen und
Volksgericht, (1958); B. Lesnodorski, supra note 3, at 506.
For the discussion of lay judges' participation in the Soviet courts see: L.S.
SHEININ, PEOPLE'S COURTS IN THE USSR, 18 ff (1957); G. Z. ANASHKIN, Narodnye
zasedateli v sovetskom sude, (1960); S. KUCHEROV, THE ORGANS OF SOVIET ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE: THEIR HISTORY AND OPERATION, (1970); H.J. Berman, Intro-
duction to Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure, in: H.J. BERMAN and J.W. SPINDLER,
SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE. The RSFSR Codes (2d ed. 1972).
It should be emphasized at this point, that lay participation in the administra-
tion of justice is considered, by the legal theory in socialist countries, to be one of
the most fundamental features of the judicial system of those countries. see:
S. Zawadzki, Instytucja lawnika ludowego jako przedmiot badan (The Institution of the
People's Lay Judge - the Subject Matter of the Research) in: S. ZAWADZKi and
L. KUBiCKI, UDZIAL LAWNIKOW W POSTEPWANIU KARNYM. OPINIE A RZECZYWISTOSC
(Participation of Lay Judges in Penal Proceedings - Opinions and Real Facts) 6
(L. Kubicki ed. 1970); see also CONSTITUTION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
(1952), Art. 49.
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The standard trial court is composed of one professional judge
and two lay judges, called in Polish legal terminology people's as-
sessors.7  In capital cases a panel is enlarged to two professionals
and three laymen. 8 Polish lay judges, unlike those in some other
countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany or Czechoslo-
vakia, 9 do not participate in appellate review. 10 Polish law allows
an exclusion of lay judges from two general categories of trials:
1) The trial of certain petty offenses, specifically listed
in the Code of Criminal Procedure;
2) Cases considered by the president of the court to be of
overwhelming factual or legal complexity.
The former may be tried in the summary proceeding by a single
professional judge, t, the latter by a panel of three professional
judges. t2 All capital cases, no matter how complex, must be tried
by the mixed tribunals composed of the professional and lay
judges. The decision, to employ exclusively professional judges in
these two categories of cases is generally within the nonreviewable
discretion of the president of the court, a power regarded by some
as inconsistent with the democratic principle of popular participa-
tion in the administration of justice.
Lay judges participate in about 50 percent of all criminal' trials,
which constitute approximately 200,000 cases a year. 13 The presi-
dent of a court assigns lay judges by names to particular cases.
7 The Law of December 2, 1960, on People's Lay Judges in Regular Courts;
J.L. No.54, item 309, art.l; CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, The Law of April 19,
1969, J.L. No. 13, item 96, [hereinafter cited as CCP, art. 19 Para. 1.]
8CCP, art. 19 Para. 2.
9 Casper and Zeisel, supra note 3, at 141-43; Zawadzki, Model ustojowy lawnika
ludowego w swietle przeprowadzonych badan prawnoempirycznych (A Model of a Lay
Judge in the Light of Legal and Empirical Research) in: ZAWADZKI and KUBICKI,
supra note 6, at 239.
10 A question of the participation of lay judges in appellate review of criminal
cases has been raised in Polish and Soviet literature. Compare, for instance:
RYBICKI, supra note 6, at 169; ZAWADZKI, supra note 9, at 239; I.D. Perlov, Prob-
lemy dalneishego rozvitiia demokraticheskikh osnov ugolovnogo sudoproizvotsva v svete
programy KPSS, SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO PRAVo, 97ff (No.1 1963).
11 CCP, arts. 419; 429, Para 1; 433, Para 1; 447, Para 3; 455. See also S. WALTOS
Postepowania szcregolne w procesie karnym (Special Proceedings in Criminal Cases),
at 135, 233, 285, (1973).
12 CCP, art.19 Para. 1.
13 ZAWADZKI, supra note 6, at 6. Lay judges are elected by people's councils
for a term of three years at the district and province level (powiat and wjewodztwo
in Polish) from among candidates proposed by the populace at meetings held in
factories, offices, and other places of employment and in rural communities.
Every citizen of a good reputation who is 26 years of age or over is eligible for
this function. See: The Law of December 2, 1960, supra note 7.
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The only relevant guideline given by the law is that a lay judge
should be assigned in principle for twelve days a year, but the
number of days may be increased by the president of a court for
"important reasons." 14  The lay judges have the same power as
the professional judges with one exception - they cannot preside.
They participate in deciding all issues of law and fact and, along
with the professional judge, decide on guilt or innocence, as well as
on the sentence. Each member of the mixed tribunal may write a
dissenting opinion.15  The law thus mandates a balance between
the professional and the lay elements within the mixed tribunal.
Although the former has more extensive legal experience, and en-
joys a more influential position as the presiding judge, the latter
prevails in number and may outvote the professional, while the
power to dissent is preserved for both.16
The role of lay judges in the mixed tribunal is multifaceted.
They represent the general population and are thus supposed to
exercise some sort of check and supervision upon all the law en-
forcement agencies involved in the judicial process. The partici-
pation of community representatives is thought to enhance the
moral prestige of the court and to strengthen its independence
both from the executive and from private pressures. Lay judges
are also supposed to bring into the decision-making process values,
opinions, and moral intuitions prevailing among the population.
They should bring to the court the unbiased "fresh look" of an
average citizen and should counteract, if necessary, the bureau-
cratic leanings of the professionals. It is widely acknowledged
The following sociodemographic data concerning persons elected to be lay
judge in 1965-67 term may be of interest: almost 48,000 lay judges have been
elected for the term, 75.3 percent of them men and 24.7 percent women; educa-
tion level: elementary - 39.6 percent, secondary - 42.4 percent, higher (university
level) - 9.6 percent; other 8.4 percent; social and occupational background: workers
(blue collar) - 23.4 percent, peasants - 8.5 percent, intelligentsia (white collar)
57.1 percent; others - 11.0 percent; party affiliation: Polish United Workers' Party
- 50.7 percent, Democratic Party - 2.8 percent, United Peasants Party - 6.9 per-
cent, no party affiliation 39.6 percent. Only 34.1 percent of lay judges elected for
the 1965-67 term had been elected once or more for the prior terms. See:
RYBICKI, supra note 6, at 255.
14 The Law of December 2, 1960, supra note 7, art. 3. The system of assignment
of lay judges to particular cases seems to be objectionable because of its arbitrari-
ness. It definitely enhances the influence of the professional element on the out-
come of the cases. It has been established that professional judges take advantage
of the system. For a further discussion and criticism of the system compare:
L. Kubicki, Udzial lawnikow w orzekaniu (Participation of Lay Judges in Adjudica-
tion): ZAWADZKI and KuBiCKI, supra note 6, at 75.
15 The Law of December 2, 1960, supra note 7, art.2; CCP, art. 101.
16 ZAWADZKI, supra note 6, at 25.
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that professional judges engaged in the routine disposition of
criminal cases over a long period of time may experience a diminu-
tion of sensitivity. Accordingly, it is thought that the confronta-
tion of a professional with a non-professional attitude might pro-
vide a healthy balance.17 The viability of the model outlined
above depends on many extra-legal factors, including the quality
of people elected to be lay judges and the attitude of the profes-
sionals toward them.
In moving from the theoretical to the practical aspect of the is-
sue, reliance is placed on a major study undertaken by the Insti-
tute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences from
1964 to 1967. The results of this remarkable research effort were
published in 1970 by Professor Sylwester Zawadzki and Dr. Leszek
Kubickils who directed the project.
LAY JUDGES: AN OPTIMISTIC SELF-ANALYSIS AND
A CRITICAL EVALUATION BY THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The lay judges' role will now be scrutinized by contrasting
their self image with pertinent opinions prevalent within the Po-
lish legal profession (including pro fessional judges, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys).
The self image of lay judges surveyed is very positive, the
overwhelming majority believe that they exert substantial and
beneficial influence on the verdicts by bringing them into har-
mony with public opinion at large.19 The legal profession is, on
the other hand, less enthusiastic. Although the majority of legal
professionals polled support the idea of lay participation in the
administration of criminal justice (seventy-five percent judges
and about sixty-five percent prosecutors and defense attorneys),
they are extremely critical of the actual implementation of the
idea. Forty-six percent of professional judges polled do not be-
17 Id. at 26.
1' S. ZAWADZKI and L. KUBICKI, UDZIAL LAWNIKOW W POSTEPOWANIU KARNYM,
OPINIE A RZECZYWISTOSC. STUDIUM PRAWNOEMPIRYCZNE (Participation of Lay
Judges in Penal proceedings - Opinions and Real Facts. A Legal and Empirical
Study) 332 (L. Kubicki ed. 1970). The book includes an English and a Russian
summary. See also: S. Zawadzki and L. Kubicki, L Udsssent populaire et le judge profes-
sionel dans la procedure penale en Pologne, REVUE DE DROIT PENAL ET LA CRIMINOLOGIE,
919-935 (1969-70).
1 See for general discussion of the opinion survey: M. Borucka-Arctowa,
Rola laivnika w sivietle pogladow samych lawnikow oraz przedstaivicieli stodol'iska
prawniczego (The Role of Lay Judges in the Light of Their Own Opinions and in
the Light of Opinions of the Legal Profession) in: ZAWADZKi and KUBICKI, supra
note 6; compare also: Kubicki, supra note 14, at 68 ff.
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lieve that lay judges have any influence on the verdicts. Eighty-
five percent of defense attorneys and seventy-three percent of
prosecutors believe that lay judges influence the verdicts only
rarely.20 This situation is generally attributed to the low quality
of people elected to be lay judges. 21 Nevertheless, a substantial
number of respondents concluded that the very presence of lay
judges in a panel does have some beneficial influence on the ad-
ministration of justice. It was emphasized that lay participation
brings the verdict into accord with public opinion. Such interac-
tion was said to contribute to the better work of professional
judges who, as the result of lay participation, have to be better
prepared for the trial and must articulate their positions with more
precision. A relatively large number of professional judges,
twenty-five percent, believe that the participation of lay judges
enhances the court's independence.22 This opinion is quite
widely shared by two other branches of the legal profession, the
prosecutors and defense attorneys. 23  Also, lay participation con-
stitutes a good defense for a professional judge against official
criticism of a verdict since he may argue that the people's asses-
sors outvoted him.24  Two statements made by the professional
judges during the interviews are worthy of quotation:
The fundamental merit of this legal institution (lay judges'
participation) is the greater independence of a lay judge. It is
true that professional judges are also independent and, accord-
ing to the law, nobody may blame them for rendering this or
that kind of a verdict, but besides the law there also exists a
criminal policy, which hampers a professional judge. . ..
A professional judge is responsible to his superiors for the
realization of criminal policy. A lay judge does not care about
criminal policy, and this makes him totally independent.
The latter of these statements was made by a professional judge
in his thirties, a member of the party. 26
It is a generally prevailing conviction among the members of
the legal profession that lay judges are more lenient on the issue
of guilt as well as on the matter of the sentencing. 27 It is believed
20 Id.
21 M. Borucka-Arctowa, supra note 19, at 40.
22 Id. at 41.
23 Id. at 44.
24 Id. at 42.
3 M. Borucka-Arctowa, supra note 19, at p. 42 f.
26 Id. at 42.
27 Id. at 56. Compare also: L. Kubicki, supra note 14.
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by some, especially by those who are opposed to the idea of lay
participation, that lay judges are more emotional in their decisions,
and that their leniency is one-sided and unreasonable. It is argued
therefore, that wholly professional tribunals are preferable.28
INFLUENCE OF LAY JUDGES ON THE VERDICTS
RENDERED WITH THEIR PARTICIPATION:
AN OBJECTIVE VIEW
How then does the' model outlined at the beginning of the
present comment and the opinions presented above relate to real-
ity? It would be fair to conclude, generally, that the real facts are
far from the ideal embodied in the model and that they are con-
siderably more positive than the rather pessimistic views of the
members of the legal profession polled in the survey.
Let us look first at the interaction between laymen and profes-
sional judges during the deliberations on the verdict. Direct ob-
servations have been carried out in 257 cases by apprentices, candi-
dates for judicial positions, working as clerks of the court.2 9
Secrecy of the deliberations, required by the CCP (art. 95) has
been preserved because reports did not disclose the identity of
cases observed and did not identify names of the persons partici-
pating. The objectivity of the data is considered very high be-
cause nobody from the panel, either professional or lay judges,
was aware that observation was going on.
In about sixty percent of sample cases the reported delibera-
tion process was clearly dominated by the professional judge, who
usually discouraged the active participation, of the lay judges. 3°
In the remaining forty percent of cases lay judges participated
in the deliberations as equal partners of the professional judge.
They freely discussed all relevant issues, often arguing with the
28 Kubicki, supra note 14, at 101; Zawadzki, supra note 9, at 230. For the ex-
position of an opinion opposed in principle to lay participation in the administra-
tion of justice see: S. Mickiewicz, De scabinis, PALESTRA (No. 3 1957).
29 Heavy reliance has been placed on a leading Polish scholar's brilliant dis-
cussion of an empirical study of 257 trials. See: Kubicki, supra note 14; see also
by the same author: Z problematyki badan empirycznoprawnych nad udzialem lawnikow w
postepowaniu karnym (Some Problems of Empirical Research on the Participation of
Lay Judges in Criminal Proceedings), PANSTWO I PRAWO (No. 1, 1967); Kubicki,
Udzial lawnikow w postepowaniu karnym w swietle obserwacji (Participation of Lay
Judges in the Criminal Proceedings in the Light of the Observations) PANSTWO I
PRAWO (No. 6, 1967).
30 Kubicki, supra note 14, at 80.
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professional judge and expressing their independent opinions. 31
It was reported that verdicts in this group of cases were often
reached either by the lay judges' outvoting the professional judge32
or by compromise. It is noteworthy that:
All the members of a panel discussed freely the case [even]
arguing with each other. Lay judges wanted to impose a sus-
pended sentence, the professional judge (a woman) opposed a
suspended sentence as too lenient. She pointed out that she
had recently imposed a lot of suspended sentences and would
be criticized by her superiors for excessive leniency. Finally
she consented. 33
The suspended sentence was imposed unanimously.
An overall analysis of the trials reported reveals that lay
judges had a clear influence on the verdicts in almost forty per-
cent of the cases.M Though this is far from the ideal, the forty
percent figure is significant, especially since it represents only
an explicit influence. There must also be a substantial amount of a
latent influence in many of the remaining cases. 35  It seems, at
any rate, that an allegation made by so many members of the legal
profession, that lay participation in the judical process is a matter
of appearance rather than of substance, has proved unfounded.
The influence of Polish lay judges on the verdicts, seems on the
basis of the above findings, to be quite meaningful and substan-
tially greater than in the Federal Republic of Germany. 36
31 Id. at 83. Dr. Kubicki distinguishes generally four types of deliberations:
(1) Those absolutely dominated by the presiding judge who takes no account
whatever of the opinions or even of the very presence of the lay judges ... (2) De-
liberations visibly dominated by the presiding judge, who observes certain formal
elements of the deliberations when the lay judges are somewhat active, but never-
theless imposes his opinion in a visible manner . . . (3) Deliberations during which
the presiding judge leaves to the lay judges the initiative to propose the settlement
of the case where they do not avail themselves of this opportunity . . . (4) Delibera-
tions during which genuine discussion starts and develops, where lay judges express
their personal opinions and views without first knowing the opinion of the pre-
siding judge (i.e. without his undesireable suggestions) and wherein the views of
all participants are aired in the discussion. The proportions between these four
types of deliberations were found as follows: Type (1) - 20.6 percent; Type (2) -
31.1 percent; Type (3) - 8.0 percent; Type (4) - 40.3 percent. Compare also:
Zawadzki and Kubicki, supra note 6, (a summary in English at 325).
32 Lay judges formally outvoted professional judges in 16 cases representing
6.3 percent of all the cases studied. Kubicki, supra note 14, at 93.
33 Id. at 84.
34 Compare an analytical table reproduced by Kubicki, supra note 14, at 103.
35 Zawadzki, supra note 9, at 229; Kubicki, supra note 14, at 105.
11 Casper and Zeisel, supra note 3.
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There is a striking coincidence between the number of deliber-
ations which were not dominated by the professional judge, and
the number of verdicts influenced by lay judges. This seems to
confirm the hypothesis that the attitude adopted by the profes-
sional judges toward lay judges is vital in gauging effective lay
participation. 37 In the overwhelming majority of cases lay judges
exerted their influences on the verdict in favor of the defendant in
about seventy-five percent of cases in which an influence of lay
judges was reported. 38
Some interesting socio-demographic correlations were estab-
lished, three of which deserve mention. Lay judges belonging
to the older age groups as well as those having better education
proved to be more influential. Higher education has a high cor-
relation to more lenient attitudes. Women, especially older ones,
are more lenient than men.39
The sentencing decision seems to be the area in which lay
judges are most actively involved and in which they exercise their
strongest influence. Seventy percent of those cases involving
sentencing decisions were influenced by lay judges in favor of the
defendant. In sixteen percent of such cases lay judges influ-
enced the sentence in favor of the prosecution. 40  The differences
found in so many cases between the professional and lay judges on
the issue of sentencing are rooted in the fact that lay judges seem
to be guided more by the personal circumstances of the defendant
and his subjective fault than by the nature of his act and criminal
policy considerations.41 On some issues lay judges are noticeably
opposed to the officially established criminal policy. For exam-
ple, they do not seem to agree that stealing of social property
should be punished more severely than stealing of personal prop-
erty, rather they favor the opposite view. 42
11 Kubicki, supra note 14, at 104.
3s Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 103.
4 ZAWADZKI, supra note 9, at 233. Compare also a very interesting study by
Dr. A. Turska: Analiza odrebnosci postaw lawnika i sedziego zawodowego w orzekaniu
(The Analysis of Divergent Attitudes of Lay and Professional Judges in Adjudica-
tion) in: ZAWADZKI and KUBICKI, supra note 6, at 159-99.
42 Compare for a general discussion: A. Turska, Opinie i postawy lawni-kow
wobec sadu, ustawodawstwa karnego i polityki karnej (Opinions and Attitudes of Lay
Judges in Respect of the Court, Criminal Legislation and Penal Policy) in:
ZAWADZKI and KUBICKI, supra note 6 at 107-58. It is rather striking that similar
attitudes seem to prevail among the general population at large; cf. M. Borucka-
Arctowa, Swiadomosc prawna w procesie przemian spoleczenstwa socjalistycznego (Bada-
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Those findings have been confirmed by the independent
study on lay judges' attitude toward purposes of criminal pun-
ishment. Their prevailing view is that the purpose of criminal
punishment is rehabilitation and individual deterrence rather than
retribution and general deterrence. 43 Lay judges did, however, fa-
vor more severe sentences than professional judges for crimes
against the person, against public order and for some crimes
against personal property, especially those involving violence
(robbery).44 The same general trends, although less clearly
marked, have been noted in Professors Casper and Zeisel's study
of the lay judges in the German criminal courts.4 5 Rarely did the
lay judges have an influence on the decision concerning guilt. In
those cases where they did, as a rule, they influenced the decision
in favor of the defendant: ten percent as compared with two per-
cent of the decisions influenced in favor of the prosecution.46 In
a major American study on the jury it was established that juries
usually adopt more favorable decisions for the defendant than
professional judges on the issue of guilt. There, the extent of the
divergence was found to be higher: nineteen percent in favor of
the defense and only three percent in favor of the prosecution.47
An analysis of cases where the professional judge, having been
outvoted by lay judges, filed a dissent, established that appellate
courts sustained lay judges' positions in forty-two percent of the
cases. 48  Thus, disparities between lay and the professional
judges, rooted in their backgrounds and attitudes, are significant-
ly reflected in their approaches toward the criminal process.
Such a confrontation of different attitudes and opinions within the
mixed tribunals found in more than half of the cases studied seems
to be healthy and of high social value.
Against the background of a very briefly outlined Polish ex-
perience two questions of more general nature may be raised.
First, the relative virtues and vices of two basic forms of lay
participation in the administration of criminal justice, that is, the
nia empiryczne Instytutu Nauk Prawnych PAN) (Legal Consciousness in the Pro-
cess of Changes of Socialist Society. An empirical study by the Institute of
Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences) PANSTWO I PRAWO 12, note
9 (No. 7, 1972).
43 A. Turska, supra note 42, at 128-30, 140.
44 Id. at 133 if; Kubicki, supra note 14, at 104.
45 Casper and Zeisel, supra note 3, at 172.
46 Kubicki, supra note 14 at 103.
47 Kalven and Zeisel, supra note 2.
48 Kubicki, supra note 14, at 100-103.
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mixed tribunal system versus a jury system. It goes without say-
ing that in making such a comparison the national traditions and
emotional attachments of the population should be taken into ac-
count. The second question, of more immediate interest and of
more practical significance, concerns lay participation in the sen-
tencing decision. The sentencing system has been most sharply
discussed in the United States in recent years, one of the main
issues being how to reduce judicial arbitrariness.49 One possible
solution could be the creation of mixed sentencing panels com-
posed of the professional and lay element. Polish as well as
West German experiences may be interpreted as rather encourag-
ing in this respect.
To the objection that. the decision making, with respect to the
sentence, requires the expert knowledge of the professional judge
one may answer in the words of Casper and Zeisel: "With respect
to criteria underlying sentencing practices among which individual
and general deterrence play important if often irreconcilable roles,
the professional judge can hardly claim to be an expert, simply
because nobody is. "50
This view seems a bit extreme. Uniformity and enforcement
of certain generally established policies are not unimportant ob-
jectives in sentencing decisions. In mixed panels the professional
judge would probably stand for them. On the other hand concern
about the individual, unique qualities of each case, particularly
regarding circumstances related to the personality of the defendant
and his future life, seem to be of high social value and are thought
of as the bailiwick of the laymen.
Reconciliation of general and individual deterrence, as criteria
underlying sentencing practices, may be much easier to achieve
if they are advocated by different persons within one collective
decision making body. Finally, it is worth noting that lay partici-
pation in decision making on the criminal sentence is quite well-
rooted in the American legal tradition. Before the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Furman v. Georgia, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972), a majority
of states permitted the jury to recommend or fix punishment in
capital cases. In about one-quarter of the states the jury deter-
mines the type and length of punishment for some or all offenses,
and in Tennessee the jury is required to fix the sentence in all
49See, for example: M. E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, LAW WITHOUT
ORDER (1973).
50 CASPER and ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 164.
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cases.51  Laymen compose grand juries which hand down indict-
ments and parole boards, making important sentencing decisions,
are typically composed of laymen. In addition, the citizens of
Vermont may find themselves on mixed tribunals as assistant
judges functioning with the professional judge in criminal cases. 5 2
51 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE - TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 26 (1967)
52 VMT. CONST. Ch. 2. § 35, 45, 49 1793 (as amended to 1964).
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